Terrorism, in its broadest sense, is defined as the use of violence, or threatened use of violence, in order to achieve a political, religious, or ideological aim. In recent times, terrorism is considered a major threat to society and therefore illegal under anti-terrorism laws in most jurisdictions. It is also considered a war crime under the laws of war when used to target non-combatants, such as civilians, neutral military personnel, or enemy prisoners of war. A broad array of political organizations have practiced terrorism to further their objectives. It has been practiced by both right-wing and left-wing political parties, nationalist groups, religious groups, revolutionaries, and ruling governments. The symbolism of terrorism can exploit human fear to help achieve these goals.

Facing contemporary security and global affairs challenges such as terrorism, cyber-attacks and hybrid warfare requires dialogue and collaboration between various disciplines within academia, as well as between academia and other stakeholders in the public and private sector. Such collaborations raise new questions and dilemmas, for instance about roles and responsibilities of stakeholders. One of the most important questions is what security issues or challenges to focus on and who should take the lead?

The page give fragments of the efforts, possibilities and barriers to establish a common security and defense policy and to make it work.

It is important that national parliaments hold their possibility to consult and to use power. On the other hand, a common European foreign policy is hardly unthinkable and allows in fact no national policies. But not all member states execute the same policy. There are 2 member states with nuclear weapons and there are member states, which are not a member of the NATO (Austria and Ireland). So, what approach?

As said, the policy area of defence has remained primarily the domain of nation states. On 18 December 2013, The German Marshall Fund posted an article by Martin Michelot, research and program officer in the Paris office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, why Europe needs to take common control on defense. It is easy to be frustrated by the pace of Europe’s progress toward a common defense strategy and the absence of urgency. Just last week, French Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault channeled feelings within French political circles when he called for “a strategy, a global vision, a global organization,” while insisting that “France isn’t asking anybody to assume its responsibilities in its place.” But Europeans finally have an opportunity to address this issue head-on at this week’s European Council meeting in Brussels.

Political level will not succeed, if pillars can not be broken, not only between external and internal security, but also between civil and military crisis-control. Fragmentation of competences, budgets and capacities can not exist longer as long as there is still talk of un-coordinated restructering of national armies. How will the EU range goals, instruments and tools for a security and defence policy?

During the gathering phenomenons as (counter)terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, piracy, failed states and organised crimes were mentioned as examples how to handle these and the paper and discussion is meant as poltical document, as a message (what does Europe want) and as basis for defence-planning. Europe should be much more active than only cooperate.

Much is happening around the EU. The US expects Europe will take more responsibility: increase of relations with NATO and African Union are part of that. But, we have to notice that not all EU-member-states are a NATO-member and vice versa, EDEO is not yet operational and that the EU is originally based on civil aspects and after that military focussed.

European Union (EU) foreign policy has long been considered the domaine réservé of the member states. but the recent study 'The influence of EU officials in European Security and Defence' shows that EU officials in the Common Security and Defence Policy are most influential in the agenda-setting phase and more influential in civilian than in military operations. This can be explained by their central position in the policy process, which allows them to get early involved in the operations.

'You are in Brussels to negotiate with other countries, but often you spend more time negotiating with the Hague…........ I felt I had more influence on policy in the Hague in Brussels than as an advisor in the Netherlands.” Dr Hans Molenaar, policy advisor at the Ministry of Defence, with five years experience with the Dutch representation in Brussels, addressed the European seminar on the challenges posed by a common foreign and security policy on 16th March and distributed papers about 'ESDP-structures', 'EU Capability Development beyond 2010'(see below)) and Post HLG 2010' (see below). Leiden University, faculty of Humanities, the Institute for History summerized:

After an overview of the history and institutional structures of decision-making, as hanged by the Lisbon Treaty, Dr Molenaar drew on his experiences in Brussels since his arrival in 2005. When he arrived, in the aftermath of the Iraq debate the member states’ views were more polarized than they are today, but even so among the larger states the poles are still set by the French and the British. These tensions reflect not only on individual policies but also on the balance within and among institutions, particularly the UN, NATO and the EU.

For the final part of his talk, Dr Molenaar described his own experience in Brussels. Whilst negotiating in Brussels, you not only represent Dutch policy, but you are well placed to assess the range of feasible options, and to advise accordingly. You can advise accordingly, and often that advice is accepted. But sometimes you have to push a policy to the point of failure before the policy (then) shifts. He then addressed a case study describing Benelux influence in shaping the agreed EU Capability Development beyond 2010, where a Benelux proposal had been largely been incorporated into the final text. From that case study he drew eight lessons for ‘Europe in practice’:

• you must know what you want very early, the earlier the better

• it is important to maintain expertise and continuity, to help predict reactions and therefore become more effective

• you need to know the balance of discussion and how to follow through

• you must be able to see not only what you want, but also the needs of your opponents (and, if possible, you need to be able to anticipate them)

• you occasionally need some good luck and always need the right circumstances

• you need to be consistent and to make sure that the message come across in the same form from all sources

• you need to be aware of the law of unintended circumstances – when a policy choice will have implications in other areas – and, again, anticipate them

• you need to work between the lines of decision-making – it is in, and around, committees that products are agreed upon.

• The talk generated many questions and even heated debate among the audience, a fitting testament to the content and the clarity of the talk and to the importance of the issues addressed. All of us were aware that as we were listening, the UN was discussing the no-fly issue over Libya following the failure of the EU, NATO and G8 to agree.

The European Commission published in November 2010 a Communication aiming at putting the EU Internal Security Strategy (ISS) into action. The Communication envisages five key strategic objectives for the EU’s internal security: disrupt organised crime, prevent terrorism, raise levels of security in cyberspace, strengthen external borders management and increase the EU’s resilience to natural disasters.

Finally: 'Lisbon' has given Europe structure.